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Abstract
We consider a common indivisible good allocation problem in which agents have both so-
cial and private endowments. Popular applications include student assignment to on-campus
housing, kidney exchange, and particular school choice problems. In a series of experiments
Chen and S￿nmez (American Economic Review 92: 1669-1686, 2002) have shown that a
popular mechanism from recent theory, the Top Trading Cycles (TTC) mechanism, induces
a signi￿cantly higher participation rate by agents with private endowments and leads to
signi￿cantly more e¢ cient outcomes than the most commonly used real-life mechanism, the
Random Serial Dictatorship with Squatting Rights.
We ￿rst show that a particular mechanism, the so-called New House 4 (NH4) mechanism,
which has been in use at MIT since the 1980s, is in fact outcome-equivalent to a natural
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1adaptation of the well-known Gale-Shapley mechanism of two-sided matching theory. This
implies that the NH4 mechanism is the most e¢ cient mechanism within the class of fair and
individually rational mechanisms, and that it is essentially the only incentive compatible
mechanism satisfying the two properties. We then experimentally compare NH4 and TTC.
We ￿nd that under NH4, the participation rate is signi￿cantly higher than under TTC. We
also propose a new e¢ ciency test based on ordinal preference information and show that
NH4 also outperforms TTC in terms of e¢ ciency.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the problem of assigning a set of indivisible goods, without explicitly
using monetary transfers, to a set of agents some of whom may also have prior claims to some of
the goods. More speci￿cally, there exist two sets of objects: those that are socially owned and
those that are privately owned. Agents have strict preferences over the objects. Three canonical
examples1 of this problem are on-campus housing, kidney exchange, and school choice for particular
settings.
Many colleges o⁄er on-campus housing opportunities to incoming as well as to already enrolled
students. In on-campus housing, the goal is to allocate dormitory rooms to students at college
campuses.2 Students consist of incoming freshmen and more senior students. Incoming freshmen
do not initially occupy any rooms, and each senior student is the occupant of a room from the
previous year. There are also vacant rooms which used to be occupied by the previous year￿ s
graduating class and have now become available for reallocation. Senior students are entitled
to keep their room but may also apply for a new one. Another ingredient in this application
1Other examples of this problem include the assignment of tasks to workers, o¢ ces to faculty, and parking
spaces to commuters.
2Clearly, there are several other examples in di⁄erent contexts, where houses are allocated to prospective
tenants using non-market mechanisms. Subsidized public housing like ￿Council Houses￿in the U.K. or ￿Housing
Commission￿dwellings in Australia are a few of such examples.
2is an exogenously given priority ordering of agents, which is usually determined according to the
assignment policies of the central clearinghouse of the particular college, and could be, for example,
based on seniority, GPA, the result of a lottery, or a combination of these.
The preferred treatment for the most serious forms of kidney disease is transplantation. Since
there is a signi￿cant shortage of deceased-donor kidneys compared to demand,3 and because a
healthy person can remain healthy on only one kidney, transplantation from a live-donor is also
quite common.4 Nevertheless, a willing donor may not always be able to donate to her intended
patient due to blood-type or immunological incompatibilities. Rapaport (1986) proposed the idea
of exchanging donors between two incompatible pairs if the donor of one pair can feasibly donate
to the patient of the other pair. Until recently, however, feasible exchanges were sought in an
unorganized and decentralized way in most parts of the United States. In a series of in￿ uential
papers,5 economists Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun S￿nmez, and Utku ￿nver have proposed innovative
ideas to implement kidney exchanges in an organized way through the lens of mechanism design:
In kidney exchange, there are patients initially paired with incompatible donors (the analogues in
this context of ￿senior students with occupied rooms￿in on-campus housing) who wish to receive
a compatible kidney, and patients without any donors (the analogues in this context of ￿incoming
freshmen￿in on-campus housing). There are also options such as altruistic donors6 and priority
on the deceased donor waiting list (the analogues in this context of ￿vacant rooms￿in on-campus
housing). In this application, a priority ordering of patients is determined based on the seriousness
of their medical conditions or their waiting-times. The mechanisms and their properties which we
discuss in this paper have immediate counterparts in the context of kidney exchange.
Another common problem in the United States and elsewhere arises when a school district
o⁄ers students the option to attend public schools other than their neighborhood schools. In
school choice, each student submits a rank-ordered-list of schools to a centralized clearing-house
3For example, in 2002 there were about 3,400 patients who died while on the waiting list. In the same year,
there were another 900 patients who became too ill to be eligible for transplantation.
4For example, in 2004 there were 6,086 live-donor transplants in the U.S.
5See Roth, S￿nmez, and ￿nver (2004, 2005ab, 2007). Also see Al Roth￿ s Market Design blog for more recent
developments on the current kidney exchange practices.
6An altruistic donor is a non-directed living donor, also known as a Good Samaritan donor.
3(e.g., school district), which then determines students￿assignments based also on school-speci￿c
priorities. While other criteria may also play a role in determining school-speci￿c priorities in
general,7 some places use residence exclusively as the sole determinant of priority.8 For example,
the Tokyo school district ￿rst gives each student the option to attend her neighborhood school
(the analogue idea in this context of ￿a senior student keeping the room she initially occupies￿
of on-campus housing); if the student chooses otherwise, then she participates in the centralized
assignment process.9
In the remainder of the paper, for convenience, we shall use the on-campus housing application
as our running example. In keeping with this, we refer to the indivisible goods that are socially
owned as vacant houses and to those that are privately owned as occupied houses. Each agent
is either a newcomer who does not currently own a house, or an existing tenant who currently
owns an occupied house and may be seeking a better one. Given the ￿xed resources, a house
allocation problem (with existing tenants) is characterized by two pieces of information: (1) a
priority ordering over all agents; and (2) a list of preferences of each agent over houses, typically
a rank-ordered-list of houses that each agent decides on by comparing di⁄erent housing types
available. An assignment mechanism is a systematic procedure that chooses an assignment of
agents to available houses based on the two pieces of information. The present paper takes a
theoretical as well as an experimental approach to this problem.
By and large, the performance of a mechanism is evaluated along four merits: (1) individual
rationality (i.e., an existing tenant should be encouraged to participate by giving her the guarantee
of obtaining a house that is no worse than her occupied house); (2) e¢ ciency (i.e., resources should
be optimally allocated according to the preferences of agents); (3) fairness (i.e., the assignment
should respect the priority order); and (4) incentive compatibility (i.e., each agent should be
7In Boston, for example, the priorities are assigned based on walk zone and whether the student has a sibling
enrolled at the particular school. A random lottery draw is also commonly used to break ties within priority groups.
8In most places in the U.S., the highest priority for a particular school is given to those students who reside
within the walk zone of the school. However, even in places where ￿proximity￿ is not the only determinant of
priority, a student often has a high chance of admission at her neighborhood school should she decide to list it as
her ￿rst choice. In this sense, most students are typically entitled to attend their neighborhood schools if they wish
to (unless perhaps if these schools are extremely popular). Hence, even more general school choice problems can
be viewed as similar to the present problem.
9We thank Yosuke Yasuda and Fuhito Kojima for bringing this example to our attention.
4induced to act straightforwardly and reveal her true preferences). Among these criteria, individual
rationality is of critical importance. This is because lack of participation by existing tenants can
entail a loss of potentially large gains from trade. Furthermore, ensuring high participation by
existing tenants not only is appealing in the context of on-campus housing but is also vital for the
sustenance and proper-functioning of a kidney transplant center. Indeed, it may not be reasonable
to expect a kidney patient to commit to a transplant that has a smaller chance of success than
the one through her own intended donor.10
A widely used mechanism is the so-called random serial dictatorship with squatting rights
(RSD).11 RSD works as follows: First, each existing tenant decides whether she will enter the
house assignment process, or keep her occupied house. The houses of those who choose to enter
become available for allocation together with the vacant houses. Second, the centralized clearing
house, e.g., the housing o¢ ce, randomly determines the priority ordering of all participating agents
from a given distribution (which may simply be uniform, or may favor some students because of a
speci￿c university policy). Finally, available houses are allocated to agents based on the priority
ordering: The ￿rst agent is assigned her top choice, the second agent is assigned her top choice
among the remaining houses, and so on.
While quite popular, RSD has a serious shortcoming: It is not individually rational. Since it
cannot guarantee an existing tenant a house at least as good as her current one, existing tenants
may show reluctance to participate under such a mechanism, which in turn may result in e¢ -
ciency losses. Abdulkadiroglu and S￿nmez (1999), arguing that some of these e¢ ciency losses can
be recovered if existing tenants are instead allowed to trade their houses through a market-like pro-
cedure, proposed the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism.12 TTC is individually rational, Pareto
e¢ cient, and incentive compatible (Abdulkadiroglu and S￿nmez, 1999). Remarkably, a follow-up
experimental study by Chen and S￿nmez (2002) found TTC to lead to higher participation rates
10Given the obvious importance of the size of the central kidney pool, participation is probably one of the most
important considerations in the kidney exchange context with many lives at stake.
11Some examples include undergraduate housing at the University of Pennsylvania, Carnegie Mellon, Duke,
Northwestern, and the University of Michigan.
12The idea of top trading cycles was originally proposed by David Gale (Shapley and Scarf, 1974). Also see
S￿nmez and ￿nver (2005) for a study on the relationship between between TTC and the core; and S￿nmez and
￿nver (2010) for an interesting characterization of TTC.
5and to more e¢ cient outcomes than the widely used RSD.
After being advocated as a promising school choice mechanism by economists Atila Abdulka-
diro… glu, Parag Pathak, Alvin E. Roth, and Tayfun S￿nmez, the well-known Gale-Shapley de-
ferred acceptance mechanism of two-sided matching theory has gained increasing popularity among
school districts in the United States, and has recently replaced two de￿cient mechanisms in New
York City (Abdulkadiro… glu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005) and Boston (Abdulkadiro… glu, Pathak, Roth,
and S￿nmez, 2005). Motivated by the success of the Gale-Shapley mechanism in numerous13 other
matching markets, this paper o⁄ers a natural and intuitive adaptation of the Gale-Shapley mech-
anism to house allocation. Our main result shows that this adaptation of the Gale-Shapley (GS)
mechanism is indeed equivalent to a real-life mechanism, the so-called New House 4 (NH4), which
has already been in use at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) for about three decades
(Theorem 1). This result has important implications. First, it shows that NH4 ful￿lls important
desirable properties such as (dominant strategy) incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and
fairness (Corollary 1). Second and more critically, it shows that NH4 is Pareto superior to any
individually rational and fair mechanism (Corollary 2). Third, it shows that NH4 is essentially
the unique incentive compatible, individually rational, and fair mechanism (Corollary 3).
We show that no mechanism can be individually rational, Pareto e¢ cient, and fair (Proposition
1). The three mechanisms we discussed, however, serve to show that any other three properties
can be satis￿ed simultaneously.14 From a theoretical point of view, TTC has the edge in terms
of e¢ ciency and NH4 in terms of fairness. Despite their theoretical appeal, it is important to
know how the two mechanisms perform in controlled laboratory experiments in order to make
better-informed policy recommendations. We designed a laboratory experiment to compare the
performance of NH4 with that of the leading theory mechanism TTC, with speci￿c attention to the
participation decisions of existing tenants and the e¢ ciency of the outcomes. In terms of existing
13Probably one of the best-known such markets is the redesigned National Resident Matching Program (Roth
and Peranson, 1999) for assigning new physicians to hospital positions. Also see Roth and Rothblum (1999) for an
extensive list of these markets.
14Hence, RSD is Pareto e¢ cient, fair, and incentive compatible. The RSD allocation is Pareto e¢ cient only
when restricted to the set of agents who participate in the assignment process, which is the e¢ ciency criterion we
adopt throughout the paper. It may, however, be ine¢ cient without such a restriction.
6tenant participation, we found that under NH4 the participation rate is signi￿cantly higher than
under TTC.
When making e¢ ciency comparisons, the matching literature has thus far relied on only car-
dinal measures of e¢ ciency.15 However, this is not directly in line with the theory because most
mechanisms elicit only ordinal preferences. Furthermore, the commonly used e¢ ciency concept
in the theoretical literature is Pareto e¢ ciency with respect to ordinal preference information,
whereas the common e¢ ciency tests are based on the payo⁄s of the subjects. In this paper, we
also make a methodological contribution to the experimental matching literature by proposing an
ordinal e¢ ciency test (OET).16 The idea is simply based on using the Pareto criterion to compare
each observed NH4 outcome with each observed TTC outcome. Observe that for any given two
outcomes, only one of the following can hold: (a) the NH4 outcome Pareto dominates the TTC
outcome; (b) the TTC outcome Pareto dominates the NH4 outcome; and (c) the two cannot be
Pareto ranked. To make the ordinal e¢ ciency comparisons, we ￿rst considered 10,000 randomly
generated priority orderings and then computed the number of cases where one mechanism￿ s out-
come Pareto dominates that of the other. Finally, we ran statistical tests to determine if there
are any signi￿cant di⁄erences between the frequencies of NH4 and TTC dominations. Based on
this test, we found NH4 to be signi￿cantly more likely to Pareto dominate TTC than the other
way around. This result can be explained by the signi￿cantly higher participation rates under
NH4 than under TTC. On the other hand, we did not discover any signi￿cant di⁄erences between
truth-telling rates under NH4 and those under TTC.
Finally, we conducted a second experiment to compare the two theoretically equivalent mecha-
nisms NH4 and GS in a laboratory environment. Behavior was far from optimal as many existing
tenants decided not to participate and a substantial proportion of individuals did not reveal their
true preferences. However, NH4 and GS induced very similar behavior in the lab. Indeed, we did
not ￿nd any signi￿cant di⁄erences between the two mechanisms in terms of participation, truthful
15See, for example, Chen and S￿nmez (2002, 2006), Pais and PintØr (2008), and Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and
Klijn (forthcoming).
16We thank Jan Eeckhout (Editorial Board) and an anonymous referee for encouraging us to think in this
direction.
7preference revelation, or e¢ ciency.
2 Related Literature
Since the seminal work of Gale and Shapley (1962), matching markets have been the focus of a
growing theoretical and experimental mechanism design literature. Some popular applications in
the literature include the design of the National Resident Matching Program (cf. Roth, 1984; and
Roth and Peranson, 1999), the design of central student assignment mechanisms for U.S. public
schools (cf Abdulkadiroglu and S￿nmez, 2003), the design of central kidney exchange clearing
houses for kidney patients (cf. Roth, S￿nmez, and ￿nver 2004, 2007), and the design of course-
bidding mechanisms at business schools (cf. S￿nmez and ￿nver, forthcoming).
Our paper lies at the intersection of the theoretical and the experimental literature on matching
markets. On the theory side, our contribution is the reported equivalence of a real-life assignment
mechanism with a celebrated mechanism from the theory of two-sided matching. To the best of
our knowledge, there have only been two similar reports on the coincidence of a real-life mechanism
with a Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance mechanism so far in the literature. The ￿rst is due to
Roth (1984) who shows that the mechanism used by the National Resident Matching Program
in the United States since 1951 until the 1990s to assign medical interns to hospital positions is
actually an exact equivalent of the hospital-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism. More recently,
Balinski and S￿nmez (1999) show that the multi-category serial dictatorship, a mechanism used
for student placement to colleges in Turkey, is actually equivalent to the college-proposing Gale-
Shapley mechanism. Interestingly, as opposed to these two equivalences, ours is the ￿rst report on
an equivalent agent-proposing Gale-Shapley mechanism. Most notably, this equivalence enables us
to single out NH4 as the most e¢ cient individually rational and fair mechanism; and as essentially
the only individually rational, fair, and incentive compatible mechanism.
Recent theory has explored a wide range of applications for top trading cycles mechanisms as a
result of their attractive e¢ ciency and incentives features. Several variations of top trading cycles
mechanisms have been studied extensively in a number matching problems. Two well-known
8applications for which this kind of mechanism has proved promising are school choice and kidney
exchange, discussed earlier.
Despite their theoretical virtues, little is known about the performances of trade-based mech-
anisms when agents are boundedly rational. Our contribution on the experimental side lies in
this direction. There is a tradition of using laboratory experiments for testing matching problems
related to di⁄erent real-world applications (cf. Olson and Porter 1994, Nalbantian and Schotter
1995, Harrison and McCabe 1996, Kagel and Roth 2000, and ￿nver 2001). Two papers closely
related to ours are those by Chen and S￿nmez (2002, 2006). The former is the only experimen-
tal study of the present problem thus far, and we have already discussed it. The latter paper
is an experimental study on three school choice mechanisms, which also includes a more subtle
and complex counterpart of the top trading cycles mechanism.17 Our experimental ￿ndings are
also consistent with those of Chen and S￿nmez (2006), who observe the Gale-Shapley mecha-
nism to generate more e¢ cient outcomes than the complex counterpart of the top trading cycles
mechanism introduced for the school choice context.18
Finally, two more recent and important contributions on experimental evaluation of school
choice mechanisms are due to Pais and PintØr (2008) and Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Klijn
(forthcoming). In the former, the authors highlight the signi￿cance of the informational environ-
ment the subjects face. In contrast with Chen and S￿nmez (2006), Pais and PintØr (2008) ￿nd
the complex counterpart of the top trading cycles mechanism to be empirically more e¢ cient than
the Gale-Shapley mechanism. Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Klijn (forthcoming) test the e⁄ect of
limiting the number of schools that can be ranked and ￿nd that the incentives of the subjects are
drastically a⁄ected by such a constraint.
17See Kesten (2006) for a theoretical comparison of the two mechanisms. Also see Erdil and Ergin (2008) and
Kesten (2010) for two new mechanisms that Pareto-improve upon the Gale-Shapley mechanism in the context of
school choice.
18In addition to the conceptual di⁄erence of house allocation from school choice due to the presence of existing
tenants, an important di⁄erence of the model considered in this paper from a school choice model is that it allows
for a simpler and more intuitive equivalent version of the top trading cycles mechanism. See Section 4.2.
93 The Model
Prior to the centralized assignment process, each existing tenant chooses whether to participate or
not. Then a house allocation problem (with existing tenants) (Abdulkadiro… glu and S￿nmez, 1999),
or a problem for short, is given by19
1: a ￿nite set of existing tenants IE+ who have chosen to participate,
2: a ￿nite set of newcomers IN;
3: a ￿nite set of occupied houses HO = fhigi2IE+;
5: a ￿nite set of vacant houses HV;
6: a priority ordering f over all agents, and
7: a list of preferences P = (Pi)IE+[IN of all agents where Pi is the preference relation of agent
i over all houses including the no-house option.
Let I = IE+ [ IN denote the set of all agents. Each existing tenant i 2 IE+ is endowed with
(i.e., currently lives in) a corresponding occupied house hi 2 HO: Let h0 denote the no-house
option, or the so-called null house. Let H = HO [ HV [ fh0g denote the set of all houses. The
exogenous priority ordering f may be determined based on certain criteria of the clearing house and
is assumed to be strict. Formally, it is a one-to-one function f : f1;2;:::;jIE+[INjg ! IE+[IN:
Thus, agent f(1) has the highest priority; agent f(2) has the second highest priority; and so on.
Let F denote the set of all priority orderings.
For each agent i 2 I; preference relation Pi is assumed to be strict. Let Ri denote the
weak preference relation associated with Pi: Formally, we assume that Ri is a linear order, i.e., a
complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric binary relation on H. That is, for any h;h0 2 H; h Ri
h0 if and only if h = h0 or h Pi h0: For expositional simplicity, we assume throughout the paper
that the null house is the last option for each agent. Our analysis straightforwardly extends to
the more general case. Let Pi denote the set of all preferences for agent i; and let B = ￿i2IPi.
19Since our focus will be on individually rational mechanisms, we use a simpler version of the model proposed
in Abdulkadiro… glu and S￿nmez (1999) to facilitate exposition. In particular, our analysis neglects the e⁄ect of the
choice of the assignment mechanism on the formation of the set of non-participating existing tenants.
10Throughout, we shall suppress the ￿rst ￿ve components of a problem assuming that they are
exogenously given and ￿xed. Hence, a problem is a pair (f;P) consisting of a priority ordering
and a list of preferences. An allocation ￿ is a list of assignments such that (1) every agent is
assigned one house; and (2) no house other than the null house is assigned to more than one
agent. Formally, it is a function ￿ : I ! H such that for each h 2 HO [ HV; j￿￿1(h)j 2 f0;1g:
Let ￿(i) denote the assignment of agent i at ￿: Let A denote the set of all allocations.
A mechanism ’ is a systematic procedure that chooses an allocation for each problem. For-
mally, it is a function ’ : F ￿ B ! A. Let ’(f;P) denote the allocation chosen by ’ for the
problem (f;P) and let ’i(f;P) denote the assignment of agent i at this allocation.
An allocation ￿ 2 A is individually rational if no participating existing tenant prefers the
house she has been occupying to the house she is assigned at ￿. Formally, for every i 2 IE+; ￿(i)
Ri hi: A mechanism ’ is individually rational if for every (f;P) 2 F ￿ B; ’(f;P) is individually
rational.
An allocation ￿ 2 A is Pareto e¢ cient if its outcome cannot be improved by an allocation
at which all agents are at least as well o⁄ and at least one agent is strictly better o⁄. Formally,
there is no ￿ 2 A such that ￿(i) Ri ￿(i) for all i 2 I and ￿(j) Pj ￿(j) for some j 2 I: A mechanism
’ is Pareto e¢ cient if for every (f;P) 2 F ￿ B; ’(f;P) is Pareto e¢ cient.
In the present context, ￿fully￿respecting the priority order f may con￿ ict with individual
rationality.20 Therefore, we propose and adopt the following intuitive ￿fairness￿ concept. An
allocation ￿ 2 A is fair if whenever an agent prefers another agent￿ s assignment to her own
assignment at ￿, then either (1) the other agent has higher priority than herself; or (2) the other
20For example, consider a simple problem with one newcomer and one existing tenant where the occupied house
is the favorite house of both agents. Then, even though the newcomer may have higher priority than the existing
tenant, any individually rational allocation must ￿favor￿the existing tenant.
11agent is an existing tenant who is assigned her own house. Formally, for every i;j 2 I; if ￿(j)
Pi ￿(i); then either f(j) < f(i); or j 2 IE+ with ￿(j) = hj: A mechanism ’ is fair if for every
(f;P) 2 F ￿ B; ’(f;P) is fair.
A mechanism ’ is (dominant strategy) incentive compatible (or, strategy-proof) if it
is a dominant strategy for each agent to truthfully report her preferences. Formally, for every
(f;P) 2 F ￿ B; every i 2 I; and every P 0
i 2 Pi; ’i(f;P) Ri ’i(f;P 0
i;P￿i):21
4 Three Mechanisms
We next study three mechanisms of interest: the most common on-campus housing mechanism in
the United States, an attractive theory mechanism, and a particular mechanism currently in use
at MIT.
4.1 Random Serial Dictatorship with Squatting Rights
Several U.S. universities including Carnegie Mellon, Duke, Northwestern, the University of Michi-
gan, and the University of Pennsylvania employ the random serial dictatorship with squatting
rights (RSD) mechanism. The mechanism works as follows:
Initially, each existing tenant decides whether she will enter the central assignment process, or
keep her current house and stay out of the assignment process. In the former case, she gives up
her occupied house, and it becomes available for allocation.
Consider a given house allocation problem (P;f). Agents are successively asked to choose their
top choice houses from the remaining ones: The ￿rst agent is assigned her top choice house; the
second agent is assigned her top choice house among the remaining ones; and so on.
The main drawback of RSD is that since it cannot guarantee an existing tenant a house no
worse than her current house, it is not individually rational. In fact, even though RSD is Pareto
e¢ cient according to our model, since some existing tenants may choose not to participate, it may
21Here, P￿i denotes the restriction of pro￿le P to the set Infig:
12not be Pareto e¢ cient within the set of all agents. Chen and S￿nmez (2002) suggest that this
aspect of the mechanism is one of its main de￿ciencies in practice.
4.2 Top Trading Cycles
Abdulkadiro… glu and S￿nmez (1999) proposed the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism, which is
based on Gale￿ s top trading cycles idea (Shapley and Scarf, 1974). TTC works as follows:22
Initially, each existing tenant decides whether she will enter the central assignment process, or
keep her current house and stay out of the assignment process.
Consider a given house allocation problem (P;f). Assign the ￿rst agent (according to f) her
top choice, the second agent her top choice among the remaining houses, and so on, until someone
demands the house of an existing tenant. If at that point the existing tenant whose house is
demanded is already assigned a house, then do not disturb the procedure. Otherwise, modify the
remainder of the ordering by inserting her at the top and proceed. Similarly, insert any existing
tenant who is not already served at the top of the line once her house is demanded. If at any
point a loop forms, it is formed by exclusively existing tenants each of whom demands the house
of the tenant next in the loop. (A loop is an ordered list of agents (i1;i2;:::;ik) where agent i1
demands the house of agent i2; agent i2 demands the house of agent i3;:::; agent ik demands the
house of agent i1:) In such cases, remove all agents in the loop by assigning them the houses they
demand and proceed.
TTC is Pareto e¢ cient, individually rational, and incentive compatible (Abdulkadiro… glu and
S￿nmez, 1999). It achieves fairness only in a weak sense.23 In their experimental study, Chen
and S￿nmez (2002) found that TTC induces higher participation rates and leads to more e¢ cient
22The description of TTC we give below di⁄ers from that of a direct adaptation of Gale￿ s original idea to
house allocation with existing tenants. Abdulkadiro… glu and S￿nmez (1999) have shown that the two alternative
descriptions are nonetheless equivalent. Chen and S￿nmez (2002) also used the version of TTC given below in their
experiments.
23Precisely speaking, in the following sense. Under TTC, it is possible that an agent, say i; may be assigned a
house worse for her than a house an agent with lower priority, say j; is assigned. In fact, when this is the case,
agent j is either an existing tenant who has been assigned her own house, or an existing tenant whose house has
been assigned either to another existing tenant or to a newcomer with higher priority than j.
13outcomes than RSD.
4.3 New House 4
The next mechanism has been in use at residence New House 4 of MIT for about three decades.24
The New House 4 (NH4) mechanism works as follows:25
Initially, each existing tenant decides whether she will enter the central assignment process, or
keep her current house and stay out of the assignment process. Consider a given house allocation
problem (P;f).
1. The ￿rst agent (according to f) is tentatively assigned her top choice among all houses, the
next agent is tentatively assigned her top choice among the remaining houses, and so on, until a
squatting con￿ ict occurs.
2. A squatting con￿ ict occurs if it is the turn of an existing tenant but every remaining house
is worse than her current house. That means someone else, the con￿ icting agent, is tentatively
assigned the existing tenant￿ s current house. When this happens:
(a) the existing tenant is assigned her current house and removed from the process, and
(b) all tentative assignments starting with the con￿ icting agent and up to the existing tenant
are erased.
At this point the squatting con￿ ict is resolved and the process starts over with the con￿ icting
agent. Every squatting con￿ ict that occurs afterward is resolved in a similar way.
The process is over when there are no houses or agents left. At this point all tentative assign-
ments are ￿nalized.
24We are not aware of any other universities using a similar mechanism. This mechanism is ￿rst reported by
Abdulkadiro… glu and S￿nmez (1999).
25See http://scripts.mit.edu/~nh4/wiki/index.php?title=Housing_Rules for an online description of this mech-
anism. The housing system at residence New House 4 was crafted through a joint e⁄ort between the president and
the housing chair in the late 70￿ s. (Personal communication with Sean Collins, the current president of New House
4.)
145 A Popular Mechanism from a Related Problem
The Gale-Shapley (deferred acceptance) mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962) has long dominated
two-sided matching theory26 because of its attractive stability and incentive properties. It has
also been adopted by a number of real-life matching markets as a much more satisfactory al-
ternative to the de￿cient mechanisms it replaced. The most recent success of the Gale-Shapley
mechanism has been in ￿school choice￿ applications in the United States. In a school choice
problem there are a ￿nite set of students, a ￿nite set of schools, a list of student preferences over
the schools including a no-school option, and a list of school-speci￿c priority orderings27 over all
students.28 The main objective in this application is to assign students to schools while accommo-
dating the school-speci￿c priority orderings. Shortly after being advocated for school choice, the
Gale-Shapley mechanism has replaced two controversial school choice mechanisms in New York
City (Abdulkadiro… glu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005) and Boston (Abdulkadiro… glu, Pathak, Roth, and
S￿nmez, 2005).
Given the growing popularity and the success of the Gale-Shapley mechanism in matching mar-
kets, it is tempting to consider an adaptation of this mechanism for house allocation problems.
Nevertheless, despite the mathematical similarities between the two indivisible good allocation
problems, there are two important di⁄erences between house allocation and school choice that
prevent us from immediately adapting the Gale-Shapley mechanism to house allocation. First,
in school choice, but not in house allocation, for each school there is a separate (often di⁄erent)
priority ordering of students; and second, in school choice but not in house allocation, the indi-
vidual rationality property is irrelevant since there is no conceptual analogue of existing tenants
and their occupied houses. Therefore, we ￿rst provide a formal link between the two problems by
transforming a given house allocation problem into an ￿associated school choice problem,￿and
then propose a direct adaptation of the Gale-Shapley mechanism to our setting.
26See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a comprehensive survey on two-sided matching.
27In the U.S., these priority orderings are typically based on a combination of a random lottery draw and speci￿c
policies of the particular school district.
28A standard school choice problem also speci￿es a capacity vector that denotes the capacity of each school. To
facilitate the exposition here we consider a ￿special￿school choice problem where each school has unit capacity.
15Given a house allocation problem (IE+;IN;HO;HV;f;P); in the associated school choice prob-
lem (I = IE+ [ IN;H = HO [ HV [ fh0g;F = (Fh)h2H;P); the set of students is the set of
all agents, the set of schools is the set of all houses, and the priority ordering for each house is
constructed from f as follows: (1) for each h 2 HV [ fh0g; let Fh ￿ f; and (2) for each hi 2 HO;
let Fhi(1) ￿ i and for each j;k 2 Infig; F
￿1
hi (j) < F
￿1
hi (k) () f￿1(j) < f￿1(k): In words, under
this transformation, in the associated school choice problem, (1) the priority ordering for each
vacant house coincides with the priority ordering f of the given house allocation problem; and
(2) the priority ordering for each occupied house assigns the highest priority for this house to the
corresponding existing tenant and exactly follows f in assigning the remaining priorities.
As with the house allocation problems, in the remainder of the paper, we shall suppress the set
of agents I and the set of houses H and de￿ne an associated school choice problem as a pair (F;P)
consisting of a list of house-speci￿c priority orderings and a list of preferences. The de￿nitions of
an allocation and a mechanism identically apply in associated school choice problems. In school
choice, a central consideration is ￿stability.￿Given a school choice problem (F;P); an allocation
￿ is stable if there is no unmatched agent-house pair (i;h) such that either (i) agent i prefers h
to her assignment and h is unassigned at ￿; or (ii) agent i prefers h to her assignment and has
higher priority for h than the agent assigned to h.29 Formally, there exists no (i;h) 2 I ￿ H such
that either (i) h Pi ￿(i) and ￿￿1(h) = ;, or (ii) h Pi ￿(i) and F
￿1
h (i) < F
￿1
h (￿￿1(h)):
Given a house allocation problem (f;P), the outcome of the Gale-Shapley (GS) mechanism is
obtained by applying the following deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962)
to the associated school choice problem (F;P):
Step 1: Each agent applies to her top choice house. If an agent applies to the null house, then
she is permanently assigned to it. For each remaining house, consider its applicants. The agent
with the highest priority according to the priority ordering for that house is tentatively placed at
that house. The rest are rejected.
29The traditional stability notion also requires each agent to be assigned a house that is at least as good as the
null house. (This is also referred as individual rationality.) Since the null house is the last option for each agent
(and since each agent is acceptable to each house) in our model, this requirement is trivially satis￿ed.
16In general:
Step k: Each rejected agent applies to her next top choice house. If an agent applies to the null
house, then she is permanently assigned to it. For each remaining house, consider its applicants at
this step together with the agent (if any) who is currently tentatively placed to it. Among these,
the agent with the highest priority according to the priority ordering for that house is tentatively
placed at that house. The rest are rejected.
The algorithm terminates when no agent is rejected any more. For any given house allocation
problem, GS always leads to a stable allocation for the associated school choice problem (Gale
and Shapley, 1962). Moreover, this is the most favorable stable allocation to agents (i.e., it Pareto
dominates any other stable allocation). Another remarkable feature of GS is that it is also incentive
compatible (Dubins and Freedman, 1981, and Roth, 1982).
6 Main Results
We start with a negative result on the trade-o⁄s among the properties of house allocation mech-
anisms. It turns out that any three of the four desirable properties we discussed in Section 2 are
compatible except for individual rationality, Pareto e¢ ciency, and fairness.
Proposition 1: No mechanism is individually rational, Pareto e¢ cient, and fair. However, there
exist mechanisms satisfying any other three properties simultaneously.
The ￿rst statement in Proposition 1 is in the same spirit as the classical impossibility between
stability and Pareto e¢ ciency in two-sided matching due to Roth (1982). For the second statement,
consider the three mechanisms we previously discussed. RSD is Pareto e¢ cient, fair, and incentive
compatible, but not individually rational. TTC is individually rational, Pareto e¢ cient, and
incentive compatible, but not fair.30 As will be shown shortly in Corollary 1, NH4 is individually
30Abdulkadiroglu and S￿nmez (1999) showed that TTC achieves the ￿rst three properties. Then Proposition 1
implies that it is not fair.
17rational, fair, and incentive compatible, but not Pareto e¢ cient.31
A much weaker notion than Pareto e¢ ciency is ￿non-wastefulness.￿ An allocation is non-
wasteful32 if no agent prefers an unassigned house to her assignment at this allocation. The
next result presents a formal connection between the three properties of individually rationality,
fairness, and non-wastefulness for a house allocation problem and the stability property for the
associated school choice problem.
Proposition 2: Given a house allocation problem (f;P); an allocation is individually rational,
fair, and non-wasteful if and only if it is stable for the associated school choice problem (F;P):
Much to our surprise, the above natural adaptation of the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance
procedure in fact always yields exactly the same outcome as NH4.
Theorem 1: NH4 and GS are equivalent.
Theorem 1, to the best of our knowledge, is the third reported coincidence of the Gale-Shapley
deferred acceptance procedure with a real-life mechanism. Interestingly, contrary to the previous
two reports, NH4 is an agent-proposing deferred acceptance procedure.
By Proposition 2, the equivalence result in Theorem 1 enables NH4 to claim all the attractive
properties of GS.
Corollary 1: NH4 (as well as GS) is individually rational, fair, and incentive compatible.
The next result states that among all fair and individually rational mechanisms, NH4 is simply
the most e¢ cient one. By Theorem 2 of Balinski and S￿nmez (1999), the following corollary is
now immediate.
31See Abdulkadiroglu and S￿nmez (1999) for an example that shows that the NH4 outcome may not be Pareto
e¢ cient. The actual housing rules at MIT also allow two agents to swap rooms if they have the consent of every
agent with priorities between them.
32Formally, an allocation ￿ 2 A is non-wasteful if for every i 2 I and every h 2 H; h Pi ￿(i) implies that there
is j 2 I such that ￿j(P) = h: A mechanism ’ is non-wasteful if for every (f;P) 2 F ￿ B; ’(f;P) is non-wasteful.
18Corollary 2: NH4 (as well as GS) Pareto dominates any other individually rational and fair
mechanism.
By Theorem 4 of Balinski and S￿nmez (1999), NH4 turns out to be essentially the only incen-
tive compatible, individually rational, and fair mechanism.
Corollary 3: NH4 (as well as GS) is the unique individually rational, fair, incentive compatible,
and non-wasteful mechanism.
The leading theory mechanism for house allocation TTC and mechanism NH4 of MIT both
satisfy three of the four properties in our desiderata. Theory suggests that TTC has the edge in
terms of e¢ ciency and NH4 in terms of fairness. Our next goal will be to experimentally test the
two mechanisms. This is the subject of the next section.
7 Experiment 1: NH4 vs. TTC
7.1 Experimental design
Our experiment compares the performances of NH4 and TTC in terms of e¢ ciency, participation
of existing tenants, and truthful preference revelation. We implemented two treatments which
di⁄er only in the house allocation mechanism. For the sake of comparison, we tried to keep our
design as close as possible to that of Chen and S￿nmez (2002); participants were given the same
description of TTC that was provided by Chen and S￿nmez (2002). As for NH4, we used the
description of this mechanism that was provided by MIT.33
We ran ￿ve replications for each treatment (NH4-1, NH4-2,..., NH4-5; TTC-1, TTC-2,...,
TTC-5). Each replica was run in a separate session at the CLER experimental lab, Harvard
Business School during spring and early summer 2006. We used Urs Fischbacher￿ s z-Tree package
33See the experimental instructions provided in the Supplementary Materials, available online, for a precise
description of the mechanisms.
19Fischbacher (2007). Each group consists of 12 participants. Participants 1 through 8 are existing
tenants. Participants 9 through 12 are newcomers. There are also 12 houses of 8 di⁄erent types
to be allocated. House types go from A to H. Participants 1 through 12 are existing tenants, each
living in a house type A through H. There are four additional vacant houses of types A, B, C,
and D. Table 1 shows the payo⁄ for each participant as a result of the house type she gets at the
end of the experiment. A square bracket, [ ], shows that the participant is an existing tenant of a
house of the speci￿ed type. For instance, participant 2 lives in a type B house. She gets $10 at the
end of the experiment if she ends up in the same house. Note that our payments are a scaled-up
version of the Chen and S￿nmez (2002) setup, as we added $5 on top of each payment in their
design. This was done in order to meet the payment criteria of the CLER laboratory. Our payo⁄
parameters have the following implications:
1. There are nine Pareto e¢ cient house allocations. The aggregate payo⁄ adds up to 231 for
each Pareto e¢ cient allocation.
2. Existing tenants￿ houses range from their second to the seventh choice. Otherwise the
decision to participate becomes trivial.
3. There is a salient monetary di⁄erence of $14 between the top and the last choice.
Both treatments, NH4 and TTC, were implemented as one-shot games of incomplete informa-
tion. Each participant knew her own payo⁄ table but not the others￿payo⁄ tables. Participants
did know the number of existing tenants and newcomers and that payo⁄tables may di⁄er. In both
treatments, existing tenants were given an option to keep their houses and then not participate
in the assignment mechanism. In line with Chen and S￿nmez (2002), participants were explained
in the instructions the workings of the mechanisms, and in particular, how an existing tenant
always obtains a house that is at least as good as her current house if she decides to participate.
Though the descriptions of the mechanisms make the individual rationality property easy to see,
this is not true for the incentive compatibility property. In neither treatment were the subjects
given any information about the incentive compatibility property of the mechanisms. If the in-
structions stated that the mechanisms are incentive compatible without explaining why, we would
20have generated an undesirable demand e⁄ect.34 That is, we would have revealed what constitutes
appropriate behavior in our experiment and that could become the main force driving the results.
The experiment was conducted as follows. Once each participant was assigned to a computer,
the experimenter read the instructions aloud, and questions were answered. Then, participants
saw their own payo⁄ table in the computer screen. Participants had 10 minutes to go over the
instructions and make decisions. Existing tenants had the option to keep their current house (by
choosing ￿out￿ ) or to participate in the mechanism (by choosing ￿in￿ ). Existing tenants who
chose ￿in￿and newcomers submitted their list of preferences. Their ID numbers were introduced
in a bowl by the experimenter, and a randomly chosen participant drew them one by one in order
to generate the initial priority ordering. At this point the assignment of the houses was computed
manually. At the end of the experiment participants were informed about the resulting assignment
and were paid accordingly.
Table 1. Payoff Table for All Agents (NH4 vs TTC)
Types of Houses A B C D E F G H
Existing Tenants #1 [11] 8 13 14 20 10 6 17
#2 11 [10] 14 13 8 17 20 6
#3 6 8 [14] 20 10 11 17 13
#4 10 14 20 [17] 8 11 13 6
#5 10 6 17 14 [8] 20 13 11
#6 20 11 14 13 6 [17] 8 10
#7 8 10 11 17 6 13 [14] 20
#8 14 20 10 17 11 8 6 [13]
Newcomers #9 6 10 17 14 11 20 13 8
#10 11 6 17 14 10 20 8 13
#11 20 10 14 6 17 11 13 8
#12 13 20 8 10 11 14 17 6
Our experimental design allows us to test the following three hypotheses based on the theo-
34See Zizzo (2010) for a state-of-the-art review of the experimenter demand e⁄ect.
21retical properties of the NH4 and TTC mechanisms:
Hypothesis 1: TTC can Pareto dominate NH4, the opposite is not true.35
Hypothesis 2: Existing tenants choose to participate under both TTC and NH4.
Hypothesis 3: Participants choose to reveal their preferences turthfully under both TTC and
NH4.
7.2 Results
To evaluate the aggregate performance of NH4 vs. TTC, we compare the outcomes generated by
each mechanism. Following the e¢ ciency concept used in the theoretical literature we use a novel
way to test for e¢ ciency based on Pareto comparisons, the ordinal e¢ ciency test (OET). As far
as we are aware, experimental studies on matching have so far used the cardinal concept of utility
when making e¢ ciency comparisons. This is the case in Chen and S￿nmez (2002, 2006), Pais and
PintØr (2008) and Calsamiglia, Haeringer, and Klijn (forthcoming). Pais and PintØr (2008) test for
the di⁄erence in proportion of average e¢ ciency across mechanisms. The other three papers follow
Chen and S￿nmez (2002) in using the recombinant estimation technique proposed by Mullin and
Reily (2006). It is worth noting that Chen and S￿nmez (2002) also include simulations in which
the environment changes randomly and both participation rates and preference revelation follow
experimental ￿ndings in order to obtain more robust results. The OET proposed in this paper
works as follows:
1. We construct the possible 25 pairs combining the 5 NH4 replicas and the 5 TTC replicas:
NH4-1 vs. TTC-1, NH4-1 vs. TTC-2,..., NH4-2 vs. TTC-1,..., NH4-5 vs. TTC-5.
2. For each pair, we randomly generate 10,000 di⁄erent priority orderings.
35Because TTC is Pareto e¢ cient and NH4 is not, according to the theory, given a ￿xed set of participating
agents, there exist problems for which the TTC outcome Pareto dominates the NH4 outcome but, for no problem
can the NH4 outcome Pareto dominate the TTC outcome. This forms the basis for our e¢ ciency hypothesis.
223. We perform a Pareto comparison for each of the 10,000 priority orderings for all 25 pairs.
4. For each pair, we count the number of times NH4 dominates TTC (NH4 dominations) and
the number of times TTC dominates NH4 (TTC dominations).
5. Finally, we use a sign rank Wilcoxon test for the equality of the 25 matched pairs of domi-
nations.
Result 1 (E¢ ciency): NH4 is more likely to Pareto dominate TTC than the other way
around.
The OET rejects the hypothesis of equality in the number of NH4 and TTC dominations:
z = 2:600 (p = 0:0093). Overall, NH4 dominates TTC 18,203 times, and TTC dominates NH4
321 times out of 250,000 Pareto comparisons. Therefore, we do not ￿nd support for Hypothesis
1. (See the Supplementary Materials, available online, for the frequency of dominations for each
of the 25 pairs considered.)
Result 2 (Participation): Existing tenants under NH4 are signi￿cantly more likely to par-
ticipate than those under TTC. The existing tenants￿overall participation rate is 77.5% under
NH4, but only 47.5% under TTC.
A test of equality of proportions shows that the participation rate of existing tenants under
NH4 is signi￿cantly higher than that under TTC: z = 2:7713 (p = 0:0028). Hence, we reject
Hypothesis 2.
23Table 3. Participation and Truthful Preference Revelation (NH4 vs TTC)
Mechanisms Group Participation rate Proportion of truthful preference revelation
NH4 NH4-1 8=8 10=12
NH4-2 5=8 8=9
NH4-3 6=8 7=10
NH4-4 6=8 9=10
NH4-5 6=8 7=10
TTC TTC-1 4=8 6=8
TTC-2 5=8 6=9
TTC-3 3=8 5=7
TTC-4 4=8 6=8
TTC-5 3=8 4=7
Table 3 shows the participation rates in column 3 and the proportions of truthful preference
revelation for each group in column 4.
Result 3 (Truthful Preference Revelation): The overall proportion of truthful preference
revelation is 80.4% under NH4, and 69.0% under TTC. The di⁄erences in proportions of truthful
preference revelation under NH4 and TTC are not statistically signi￿cant.
A test of equality of proportions shows that the proportion of truthful preference revelation
under NH4 is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from that under TTC: z = 1:2250 (p = 0:1103). However,
neither NH4 nor TTC induced thruthful preference revelation for all participants. Therefore, we
reject Hypothesis 3.
Results 1 to 3 show behavior deviating from theory in both the NH4 and the TTC treatments.
NH4 is found to achieve greater e¢ ciency than TTC. Since we do not ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences
in truthful preference revelation (Result 3), we can conclude that participation is the key to why
NH4 is outperforming TTC even though theory does not support this ￿nding.
248 Experiment 2: NH4 vs. GS
8.1 Experimental design
Our second experiment tests the theoretical equivalence of NH4 and GS. The design of this exper-
iment follows the design of NH4 vs. TTC, but there are a few di⁄erences. We again implemented
two treatments, NH4 and GS, which di⁄er only in the house allocation mechanism, or rather in
the descriptions of the mechanisms given in the instructions.
We ran eight replications for each treatment (NH4v-1, NH4v-2,..., NH4v-5; GSv-1, GSv-2,...,
Gsv-5) in two sessions for NH4 and three sessions for GS. Each session was run at the LINEEX
experimental laboratory, University of Valencia, during spring 2010. Table 4 shows the payo⁄
for each participant as a result of the house type she gets at the end of the experiment. Table 4
contains payo⁄s in Euros obtained by using the Euro/$ exchange rate at the time and rounding
to the closest integer. On top of the payments shown in Table 4, participants were paid a 3EUR
show-up fee and 0.50EUR for each right answer in an 8-question post-experiment quiz.36 Other
than the di⁄erent show-up fee and the reference to the post-experiment quiz, the NH4 instructions
used in Valencia are a Spanish translation of the original instructions used for the Harvard NH4
vs TTC experiments. A new set of instructions for GS was written in English and also translated
into Spanish. (See the Supplementary Materials, available online.)
36The questionnaire is related to a di⁄erent project. The questions are available upon request.
25Table 4. Payo⁄ Table for All Agents (NH4 vs GS)
Types of Houses A B C D E F G H
Existing Tenants #1 [9] 6 10 11 16 8 5 14
#2 9 [8] 11 10 6 14 16 5
#3 5 6 [11] 16 8 9 14 10
#4 8 11 16 [14] 6 9 10 5
#5 8 5 14 11 [6] 16 10 9
#6 16 9 11 10 5 [14] 6 8
#7 6 8 9 14 5 10 [11] 16
#8 11 16 8 14 9 6 5 [10]
Newcomers #9 5 8 14 11 9 16 10 6
#10 9 5 14 11 8 16 6 10
#11 16 8 11 5 14 9 10 6
#12 10 16 6 8 9 11 14 5
Our experimental design allows us to test the following three hypotheses based on the theo-
retical equivalence of the NH4 and GS mechanisms:
Hypothesis 4: NH4 and GS cannot Pareto dominate each other.
Hypothesis 5: Existing tenants choose to participate under both NH4 and GS.
Hypothesis 6: Participants choose to reveal their preferences truthfully under both NH4 and GS.
8.2 Results
Result 4 (E¢ ciency): NH4 and GS are equally likely to Pareto dominate each other.
The OET does not reject the hypothesis of equality in the number of NH4 and GS domi-
nations: z = 0:375 (p = 0:7080). Overall, NH4 dominates GS 6,790 times, and GS dominates
NH4 3,896 times out of 250,000 Pareto comparisons. Hypothesis 4 is therefore rejected. (See the
26Supplementary Materials, available online, for the frequency of dominations for each of the 25
pairs considered.)
Result 5 (Participation): Existing tenants are equally likely to participate under both mech-
anisms. The existing tenants￿overall participation rate is 67.0% under NH4, and 70.3% under
GS.
A test of equality of proportions shows that the participation rate of existing tenants under
NH4 does not di⁄er from that under TTC: z = ￿0:38 (p = 0:65). Existing tenants do not always
choose to participate. Thus, Hypothesis 5 is rejected.
Table 5. Participation and Truthful Preference Revelation (NH4 vs GS)
Mechanisms Group Participation rate Proportion of truthful preference revelation
NH4 NH4v-1 4=8 3=8
NH4v-2 3=8 2=7
NH4v-3 7=8 9=11
NH4v-4 7=8 5=11
NH4v-5 7=8 7=11
NH4v-6 4=8 6=7
NH4v-7 6=8 8=10
NH4v-8 5=8 8=9
GS GSv-1 5=8 4=9
GSv-2 7=8 7=11
GSv-3 5=8 7=9
GSv-4 6=8 6=10
GSv-5 4=8 4=7
GSv-6 6=8 7=10
GSv-7 7=8 6=9
GSv-8 5=8 6=9
27Table 5 shows participation rates in column 3 and proportions of truthful preference revelation
for each group in column 4.
Result 6 (Truthful Preference Revelation): The di⁄erences in proportions of truthful pref-
erence revelation under NH4 and GS are not statistically signi￿cant. The overall proportion of
truthful preference revelation is 63.9% under NH4 and 63.3% under GS.
A test of equality of proportions shows that the proportion of truthful preference revelation
under NH4 is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from that under GS: z = 0:17 (p = 0:43). Preferences are
often not truthfully revealed. Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is rejected.
Results 4 to 6 show behavior deviating from theory in both treatments of the experiment. We
did not ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences in either participation or truthful preference revelation, and
thus found no signi￿cant di⁄erence in e¢ ciency. Our experiments suggest that, in expected terms,
NH4 and GS generate similar results. Consequently, we do not ￿nd any empirical evidence to
prefer NH4 over GS or the other way around.
9 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we have studied the problem of ￿nding the ￿right￿house allocation mechanism to
allocate on-campus housing units to students from a market-design perspective. Abdulkadiro… glu
and S￿nmez (1999) and Chen and S￿nmez (2002) advocated the prominent theory mechanism
TTC as a serious candidate to replace the popular real-life mechanism RSD. In theory, TTC
is Pareto e¢ cient, individually rational, and incentive compatible, but not fair. We analyzed
the MIT house allocation mechanism known as NH4. In theory, NH4 is individually rational,
incentive compatible and fair, but not Pareto e¢ cient. By Theorem 1, NH4 is however, the only
constrained-e¢ cient mechanism among all mechanisms that are individually rational and fair.
We designed a laboratory experiment in which NH4 and TTC went head to head. Notwith-
standing the theoretical advantage of TTC, NH4 turned out to be superior to TTC in terms of
both participation rates and e¢ ciency. We designed a second experiment to test the theoretical
28equivalence of NH4 and GS in the lab. Not all the existing tenants chose to participate and prefer-
ences were not always revealed truthfully. Furthermore, we did not ￿nd any signi￿cant di⁄erences
between the two mechanisms in terms of participation, truthful preference revelation, or e¢ ciency.
A second reason to be optimistic about the e¢ ciency performance of NH4 comes from a result
due to Ergin (2002): Loosely speaking, Ergin (2002) showed that GS tends to be more e¢ cient as
the priority orderings for each house tend to be more ￿correlated.￿One feature of the particular
adaptation of GS we have considered that might contribute to this possibility is that all the house-
speci￿c priority orderings for GS (the equivalent of NH4) are, by construction, generated from the
same priority ordering.
10 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: For the ￿rst statement consider the following example. Suppose
IN = f1;2g; IE+ = f3g; HV = fa;bg; and HO = fh3g: Suppose the priority ordering f is 1-2-3.
Agents￿preferences are as follows:
R1 R2 R3
h3 a a
a h3 h3
b b b
Any Pareto e¢ cient mechanism has to assign either agent 2 or agent 3 to house a; for otherwise
agent 1 gets house a and is made better o⁄ when she swaps it with the agent who gets house h3
(who is also made better o⁄ by this swap). Then, since agent 2 has higher priority, by fairness
she should be assigned house a. This means, by individual rationality, agent 3 should be assigned
house h3. Then agent 1 is assigned house b: But this clearly violates fairness. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Take an allocation ￿ 2 A. Clearly, condition (i) of stability of ￿ for
(F;P) is equivalent to the non-wastefulness of ￿ for (f;P): Suppose that ￿ is individually rational,
fair, and and non-wasteful for (f;P) but not stable for (F;P): Then there exists (i;h) 2 I ￿ H
29such that h Pi ￿(i) and F
￿1
h (i) < F
￿1
h (￿￿1(h)): If h = hi; then ￿ is not individually rational. If
h 6= hi; then ￿ is not fair.
Suppose that ￿ is stable for (F;P) but not individually rational for (f;P). Then there exists
j 2 I with hj Pj ￿(j): Since Fhj(j) = 1 by construction, ￿ cannot be stable for (F;P): Suppose
that ￿ is stable for (F;P) but not fair for (f;P): Then there exist k;l 2 I with ￿(k) Pl ￿(l)
such that f￿1(l) < f￿1(k) and either k 2 IN; or k 2 IE+ and ￿(k) 6= hk: For both cases, by
construction, F
￿1
￿(k)(l) < F
￿1
￿(k)(k): Thus, ￿ cannot be stable for (F;P): Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1: Fix a problem (f;P): Let (F;P) be the associated school choice problem.
We ￿rst introduce a useful notion of a ￿partial allocation￿to denote the pseudo-allocations that
form during the execution of the NH4 algorithm as well as the DA algorithm. Let I0 ￿ I: A
partial allocation is a function ￿ : I0 ! H such that for each h 2 HO [ HV; j￿￿1(h)j 2 f0;1g: In
this case, we say that partial allocation ￿ is de￿ned on I0: Clearly, any allocation is also a partial
allocation (de￿ned on I). A partial allocation ￿ de￿ned on I0 is fair for a set of agents I00 ￿ I0 if
for all i;j 2 I00; whenever ￿(j) Pi ￿(i); then either f(j) < f(i); or j 2 IE+ with ￿(j) = hj:
McVitie and Wilson (1970) showed that under the DA algorithm, the ordering according to
which agents make proposals to houses has no e⁄ect on the outcome, and proposed an equivalent
version of the DA algorithm, where agents make their applications according to any given ordering.
To prove Theorem 1 we use the McVitie-Wilson version of the DA algorithm in which agents apply
to houses in turn according to the ordering f. More precisely, it will be convenient to think of the
DA algorithm in the following way:
First, agent f(1) applies to her favorite house, say, to house h1. Since there are no previous
applicants, she is tentatively assigned to her favorite house at the partial allocation that forms.
Second, agent f(2) applies to her favorite house, say, to house h2. If h2 = h1 and h2 6= hf(2); then
[since F
￿1
h2 (f(1)) < F
￿1
h2 (f(2))] agent f(2) is rejected from h2: Otherwise, agent f(2) is tentatively
assigned to h2 at the partial allocation that forms. If some agent is rejected from house h2 in
either case, then she applies to her next favorite house as in the usual DA algorithm.... In general,
agent f(k) applies to her favorite house, say, to house hk: If hk received a previous application
and hk 6= hf(k); then agent f(k) is rejected from hk: Otherwise, agent f(k) is tentatively assigned
30to hk at the partial matching that forms: If some agent is rejected from house hk in either case,
then she applies to her next favorite house. Similarly, any subsequently rejected agent applies to
her next favorite house, and the process continues as in the usual DA algorithm until no agent is
rejected any more; and so on.
The following observations will be useful in proving Theorem 1.
Lemma 1: Any partial (and tentative) allocation obtained throughout the NH4 algorithm is fair
for the agent set it is de￿ned on. Thus, NH4 is fair. Similarly, any partial (and tentative)
allocation obtained throughout the DA algorithm is fair for the agent set it is de￿ned on. Thus,
GS is fair.37
Proof. Take any partial allocation ￿ : I0 ! H that forms at some instance of the NH4
algorithm. Let i 2 I0 and h = ￿(i): There are two cases to consider:
Case 1. i is not a squatting agent: Consider the instance of the algorithm when i is assigned
h: When it is the turn of agent i; she is assigned her best choice among the remaining houses.
This implies that any house that she prefers to h must be previously assigned to a higher priority
agent than i, or to its owner because of a squatting con￿ ict. Then we conclude that for all j 2 I0;
if ￿(j) Pi ￿(i); then either f(j) < f(i); or j 2 IE+ with ￿(j) = hj:
Case 2. i is a squatting agent: Clearly, h = hi: Consider the instance of the algorithm when
i is assigned h: When it is the turn of agent i; all remaining houses are worse for her than hi.
Thus agent i squats and all the (tentative) assignments starting with the con￿ icting agent and
up to agent i are erased. Next, the con￿ icting agent is to be assigned her top choice among the
remaining houses. Note that the set of remaining houses at this point is a strict subset of the set
of remaining houses when the con￿ icting agent was (tentatively) assigned hi: Since the preferences
of the agents who have higher priority than i but weakly lower priority than the con￿ icting agent
are ￿xed, when it is the turn of agent f(f￿1(i)+ 1); the set of remaining houses is a strict subset
of the set of remaining houses at the point agent i squatted. Consequently, agent f(f￿1(i) + 1)
cannot be assigned a house that i prefers to hi: Combining this with Case 1 implies that for all
37Clearly, Proposition 2 also implies that GS is fair.
31j 2 I0; if ￿(j) Pi ￿(i); then either f(j) < f(i); or j 2 IE+ with ￿(j) = hj:
Take any partial allocation ￿0 : I0 ! H that forms at some instance of the DA algorithm. Let
i0 2 I0 and h0 = ￿(i0): Then until this point agent i0 must have been rejected by all houses that
she prefers to h0: Hence, any such house must be tentatively holding an agent who has higher
priority than i0 according to F: But the tentatively held agent has higher priority for that house
according to F only if she has higher priority than i0 according to f; or if she is the owner of that
house. Thus, for all j 2 I0; if ￿0(j) Pi ￿(i0); then either f(j) < f(i0); or j 2 IE+ with ￿(j) = hj:
Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: Given I0 ￿ I; let ￿ and ￿0 be two partial allocations de￿ned on I0: Suppose the set of
existing tenants who are assigned their own houses are the same at ￿ and ￿0: Let J denote this
set. If ￿ and ￿0 are both non-wasteful and fair for I0nJ; then ￿ = ￿0:
Proof. Let H0 = Hn [j2J fhjg: Consider the highest priority agent in I0nJ: Since both ￿ and
￿0 are fair and non-wasteful, they should both assign her her top choice in H0. Next, consider
the second highest priority agent in I0nJ: Since both ￿ and ￿0 are fair and non-wasteful, they
should also assign her her top choice among the remaining houses in H0. Continuing similarly, we
conclude that for all i 2 I0nJ; ￿(i) = ￿0(i): Then ￿ = ￿0: Q.E.D.
We give a direct proof of Theorem 1. We show that the set of existing tenants who are assigned
their own houses are the same under the two mechanisms at the problem (f;P). Then, since both
algorithms￿outcomes are fair by Lemma 1 and non-wasteful,38 by Lemma 2 they have to choose the
same allocation. Let ￿ and ￿ respectively be the NH4 allocation at (f;P) and the GS allocation
at (F;P).
Let S = fi1;i2;:::;iTg ￿ IE+ be the set of agents who squatted in the NH4 algorithm.
W.l.o.g., let the subscripts denote the order with which they squatted. We show that for each
i 2 S; ￿(i) = hi: We argue by induction.
Consider agent i1: We observe how the tentative and partial allocation is obtained until just
before the ￿rst squatting con￿ ict under the NH4 algorithm. First, agent f(1) is tentatively assigned
38By Proposition 1, GS is non-wasteful. The fact that NH4 is also non-wasteful can be straightforwardly veri￿ed.
32her top choice house in H; next, agent f(2) is tentatively assigned her top choice among the
remaining houses;...; and ￿nally, agent f(f￿1(i1) ￿ 1) is tentatively assigned her top choice
among the remaining houses. Under the DA algorithm, ￿rst, agent f(1) applies to her top choice
house to which she is tentatively assigned;...; in general, agent f(k) with 2 ￿ k ￿ f￿1(i1) ￿ 1;
eventually applies to her top choice house among those that no one has applied to before and is
tentatively assigned to it. Let ￿1 denote the partial allocation that forms under the NH4 algorithm
just before agent i1 squats. Note that ￿1 is de￿ned on I0
1 = ff(1);f(2);:::;f(f￿1(i1) ￿ 1)g: Let
￿1 denote the partial allocation that forms under the DA algorithm just before agent i1 starts
to apply. Clearly, ￿1 is also de￿ned on I0
1: Moreover, upon contrasting the two procedures, it is
straightforward to see that ￿1 = ￿1:39 Under the NH4 algorithm, when it is the turn of (existing
tenant) i1; by assumption, all available houses are worse for her than hi1: Under the DA algorithm,
when it is the turn of agent i1 to start to apply, since ￿1 = ￿1; she applies to all the houses she
prefers to hi1 (if any), and in turn gets rejected from each such house since it is now tentatively
assigned to some agent who, by the construction of F, has higher priority for it than i1. Then
agent i1 applies to hi1: Since she has the highest priority for hi1; she is tentatively assigned to hi1:
From this point on, any agent who applies to hi1 is rejected, i.e., i1 is permanently assigned to
hi1. Hence, ￿(i1) = hi1:
Suppose that for each i2;:::;ik￿1 2 S; we have ￿(i2) = hi2; :::;￿(ik￿1) = hik￿1: [Induction
hypothesis] We show that ￿(ik) = hik: Let ￿k be the partial allocation that forms under the NH4
algorithm just before agent ik squats. Note that ￿k is de￿ned on I0
k = ff(1);f(2);:::;f(f￿1(ik)￿
1)g: Let ￿k be the partial allocation that forms under the DA algorithm just before agent ik starts
to apply. Clearly, ￿k is also de￿ned on I0
k: By Lemma 1, both ￿k and ￿k are fair for I0: Since they
are both also non-wasteful, by Lemma 2 and the induction hypothesis, ￿k = ￿k: Under the DA
algorithm, when it is the turn of agent ik to start to apply, since ￿k = ￿k; she applies to all the
houses she prefers to hik (if any), and in turn gets rejected from each such house since it is now
tentatively assigned to some agent who has higher priority for it than ik. Then agent ik applies to
39An alternative way to show this is to invoke Lemma 2 with J = ;: Here we adopt the longer and direct proof
to provide further insight into the equivalence result.
33hik: Since she has the highest priority for hik; she is tentatively assigned to hik: From this point on,
any agent who applies to hik is rejected, i.e., ik is permanently assigned to hik. Hence, ￿(ik) = hik:
This completes the proof. Q.E.D.
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